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WHAT CAN THE BROTHERS MALONE TEACH 
US ABOUT FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS? 
Charlie Gerstein* 
Introduction 
In 1975, the Brothers Malone took the entrance exam for the Boston 
Fire Department. At the time, the Department was under a court-ordered 
affirmative action plan: it divided its pool of test-takers into groups of black 
and white applicants and gave substantial preference to those in the former. 
The Brothers listed themselves as white and didn’t make the cut.1 
In 1977, the Brothers Malone again took the entrance exam for the Bos-
ton Fire department, this time listing themselves as black. The Brothers 
became firemen. Within a few years, someone at the Fire Department grew 
suspicious of the Malones. An investigation ensued. The Department deter-
mined that the Brothers had falsified their applications. Eventually a Suffolk 
County Judge was forced to decide whether the Malones were black or 
white.2 Judge Herbert Wilkins sought three kinds of evidence to make his 
determination.  
[T]he Malones might have supported their claim to be Black[:] (1) by vis-
ual observation of their features; (2) by appropriate documentary evidence, 
such as birth certificates, establishing Black ancestry; or (3) by evidence 
that they or their families hold themselves out to be Black and are consid-
ered to be Black in the community.  
He found the Brothers Malone to be white. They had “fair skin, fair hair 
coloring and Caucasian facial features.” The Malones’ birth certificates and 
their parents’ birth certificates show that the Malone family had been report-
ed “consistently as white for three generations.” Finally, “there was no 
evidence that the Malones identified themselves personally or socially as 
Blacks.”3 By the time Judge Wilkins ruled, eleven Boston firefighters were 
under investigation for allegedly fibbing about their race.4 
Does this episode trouble you? Are you uncomfortable with a judge tak-
ing a look at a pair of brothers and saying “they’re white?” Or with a judge  
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 1. Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of “Race” in Race-
Conscious Law, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 1231, 1232 (1994). 
 2. Id. at 1233 (quoting Malone v. Haley, No. 88-339, (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Suffolk 
Cnty. July 25, 1989)). 
 3. Id.  
 4. Peggy Hernandez, Firemen Who Claimed To Be Black Lose Appeal, Boston 
Globe, July 26, 1989, at 13–14. 
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and declaring that they don’t “socially [identify]” as black? If so, rest easy: 
this is the only such instance to be readily found in legal databases. While 
race remains a factor of legal significance in several contexts, courts avoid 
adjudicating litigants’ race.  
This Essay argues that squeamishness about deciding people’s race can 
explain some otherwise baffling trends in affirmative action jurisprudence. 
The Supreme Court’s fear of letting government agencies decide, as a factu-
al matter, the race of individual students may explain its odd and seemingly 
inconsistent reluctance to use race as a factor in admissions. Part I discusses 
various legal strategies for adjudicating race and why we may be uncom-
fortable with them. Part II argues that Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. 
Bollinger can be explained through the lens of the Malones, using the Fifth 
Circuit’s reading in Fisher v. The University of Texas, the challenge to Tex-
as’s affirmative action program heading to the Supreme Court this term. Part 
III proposes a new reading of Grutter—arguing that Grutter serves to pro-
tect a school’s right to select students on nonracial grounds—and suggests 
some implications for the program at issue in Fisher.  
I. Discomfort with Adjudicating Race 
Race seems fundamentally impossible to adjudicate in a satisfying man-
ner. Professor Christopher Ford outlines several possibilities for race 
adjudication, drawing examples of classificatory systems from apartheid 
South Africa, caste-system India and the Jim Crow South. All of these 
schemes can be divided into two basic, self-explanatory possibilities: “self-
ascribed” and “other-ascribed” identifications.5 The former invite the un-
scrupulous to deceive; the latter seem counter to our basic notions of self-
description and self-determination. Apartheid South Africa comes closest to 
what Ford calls “racial due process,” with hearings, appeals, and extensive 
evidentiary proceedings available to contest a legally binding racial deter-
mination. 
Consider next the intricacies of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission’s “spot checks” of employer-reported minority statistics; they 
are, to say the least, unlikely to be accurate. Without delving too deeply into 
the issue, it suffices to note that the Commission discourages the use of self-
reported statistics because of their tendency to invade employees’ privacy. 
Instead, the Commission’s guidelines encourage employers trying to dis-
prove allegations of underutilizing minority workers to conduct a “visual 
survey” of their employees. The employers are then encouraged to report the 
racial composition of their workforces. Indeed, the foxes are running the 
henhouses. 
Government adjudication of race may also conjure a deeply unpleasant 
image in our collective memory.6 Indeed, in an era of anti-miscegenation 
                                                                                                                      
 5. Ford, supra note 1, at 1267. 
 6. See Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember 1 (1989) (discussing the char-
acteristics and formation of collective memory). 
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laws and de jure segregation, American states needed ways to decide who 
belonged to which racial group. And each state had one. Virginia entrusted 
racial determinations to bureaucratic agents.7 In 1944, the state codified its 
bureaucratic system, including a provision for what to do when the Registrar 
of Vital Statistics feared someone’s race was “incorrect.”8 If the court clerk 
was, say, about to issue a marriage license but then found “reasonable cause 
to disbelieve” the bride or groom’s race, the clerk was to withhold the li-
cense until “satisfactory proof” was provided.9 The punishment for a “false” 
racial self-identification was a year in prison.10 Missouri, for its part, had 
juries determine the racial status of individual litigants.11 Each state provid-
ed a definition of who counted as black. Ohio defined someone as black if 
she had “any distinct and visual admixture of African blood.”12 Georgia 
characterized as black “all negroes, mulattoes, mestizos and their descend-
ants, having any ascertainable trace of Negro or African, West Indian or Asi-
Asiatic Indian blood in their veins.”13 Does this seem meaningfully different 
from what Judge Wilkins did? 
Are you uncomfortable now? 
II. Reluctance to Define Race Explains the 
Distinction in GRATZ and GRUTTER 
Much ink has been spilled about the “split double-header”14 of Grutter v. 
Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger.15 In those opinions, the Supreme Court 
drew a distinction between the affirmative action programs at issue—one 
that may be difficult to justify or understand at first; but it can be explained 
by the Court’s squeamishness about race.  
The distinction these cases concoct baffles many first-year constitutional 
law students. Post-Gratz and Grutter, a school may constitutionally use race 
as an explicit bonus in an admissions process that holistically reviews each 
application for the purpose of establishing a critical mass of minority stu-
dents (with the size of a critical mass differing for different minorities), but 
it may not assign specific point values to minority status, even in an other-
                                                                                                                      
 7. Ford, supra note 1, at 1275. 
 8. Id. (citing Act of February 22, 1944, ch. 52, 1944 Va. Acts 51, 54). 
 9. Paul A. Lombardo, Miscegenation, Eugenics, and Racism: Historical Footnotes to 
Loving v. Virginia, 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 421, 436 (1988) (quoting An Act to Preserve Racial 
Integrity, 1924 Va. Acts 534). 
 10. An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity, 1924 Va. Acts 534, available at 
http://www2.vcdh.virginia.edu/encounter/projects/monacans/Contemporary_Monacans/racial.
html. 
 11. Ford, supra note 1, at 1275–76. 
 12. David H. Fowler, Northern Attitudes Towards Interracial Marriage: 
Legislation and Public Opinion in the Middle Atlantic and the States of the Old 
Northwest, 1780–1930, at 201 (1987). 
 13. Id. at 362. 
 14. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 348 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 15. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
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wise similarly holistic admissions process. In essence, these cases hold that 
race is only an acceptable factor in admissions when it is interpreted in light 
of an applicant’s broader life experience. Regardless of one’s opinion on the 
merits of either case, the distinction may seem silly at best and purposefully 
disingenuous at worst. “If honesty is the best policy,” Justice Ginsburg ex-
plained in her dissent in Gratz, “surely Michigan’s accurately described, 
fully disclosed College affirmative action program is preferable to achieving 
similar numbers through winks, nods, and disguises.”16  
The Fifth Circuit in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin has taken the 
holdings of Gratz and Grutter to their natural conclusion, effectively writing 
race out of the college admissions calculus.17 In Fisher, the appellate court 
noted that “it would be difficult for UT to construct an admissions policy 
that more closely resembles the policy approved by the Supreme Court in 
Grutter.”18 And if we take the Fifth Circuit’s view, the black daughter of a 
cardiac surgeon will likely lose in a heads-up contest to the white daughter 
of a low-income high school dropout, ceteris paribus. Indeed, the Fifth Cir-
cuit writes that permissible consideration 
does not define an applicant by race but instead ensures that she is valued 
for all her unique attributes. . . . Both Bakke and Gratz firmly rejected 
group treatment, insisting that the focus be upon individuals and that an 
applicant’s achievements be judged in the context of one’s personal cir-
cumstances, of which race is only a part. So deployed, a white applicant 
raised by a single parent who did not attend high school and struggled 
paycheck to paycheck and a minority child of a successful cardiovascular 
surgeon may both claim adversity, but the personal hurdles each has 
cleared will not be seen to be of the same height.19  
This reading of Gratz and Grutter leads inexorably to the conclusion 
that race in and of itself, divorced from correlative social and economic 
phenomena, cannot be weighed in an applicant’s favor: for how can we use 
race to allocate admissions benefits if we do not define someone to be of a 
particular race? Quite simply, if race may be considered only as part of a 
holistic person, without regard to balancing members of that race with 
members of other races, without reducing individuals to members of that 
race, and without giving preference to members of that race over white stu-
dents from disadvantaged backgrounds, what could “race” possibly do? The 
Fifth Circuit’s reading thus writes race out of the admissions calculus.  
Considering these cases in light of the Brothers Malone, removal of race 
as a consideration may have been the Court’s intention in Gratz and Grutter. 
The majorities in these cases wasn’t advocating subterfuge; rather, they 
urged that we abandon race in favor of other factors that, in their view, more 
closely approximate an index of social disadvantage. In permitting race to 
                                                                                                                      
 16. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304. 
 17. 631 F.3d 213, 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2005 WL 2034942 (U.S. Feb. 21, 
2012) (No. 11-345)).  
 18. Id. at 218. 
 19. Id. at 221 (emphasis added). 
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be evaluated only in light of the social context in which the applicant was 
raised, the Court effectively precluded any admissions advantage from ac-
cruing to on the basis of a hard-and-fast determination of her race. The 
majorities in Gratz and Grutter avoided the thorny problem Judge Wilkins 
faced—they sought to avoid situations in which the government must neces-
sarily decide someone’s race. 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 
the Court’s most recent pronouncement on race in schools, advances this 
reading.20 In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy (the Justice whose vote will 
almost certainly determine the ultimate fate of Fisher) expresses concern 
with the consequences of racial definitions: 
When the government classifies an individual by race, it must first define 
what it means to be of a race. Who exactly is white and who is nonwhite? 
To be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is inconsistent with 
the dignity of individuals in our society. And it is a label that an individual 
is powerless to change.21 
So Justice Kennedy naturally proposes a host of methods that a school dis-
trict may use to increase the racial diversity of its student body, all of them 
facially race-neutral but intentionally race-conscious. In Parents Involved, 
Justice Kennedy—perhaps inadvertently—explores the consequences of 
reading Grutter to preclude race as an admissions factor; as part of his pro-
posed methods, committees must instead decide on the basis of factors that 
correlate with race.  
A pair of hypotheticals illuminate Justice Kennedy’s position. Imagine 
the Brothers Malone had applied to the University of Michigan Law School 
in 2002, describing themselves, of course, as black. Let every other aspect 
of their application be true. Under the Gratz plan, an admissions officer who 
gets wise to the Malones, and the admissions committee that sorts out the 
mess, would be forced to define whiteness per se before they can define the 
Malones as white. These hypothetical Malones (as the real Brothers did) 
will claim that the University asked only for “racial self-identification” and 
that this is how they so identify. But the Gratz plan, as the Court briefly and 
obliquely notes, involved “a factual review of an application to determine 
whether an individual is a member of one of these minority groups.”22 That 
this is “the only consideration” accompanying the distribution of points to 
members of minority groups troubled the Court and seems to have influ-
enced its negative treatment of the Gratz plan.23 If the admissions committee 
was suspicious of the Malones under a Gratz plan, it would have to explain 
what happened to the points in their scores and would, therefore, have to 
determine and openly declare that they were not, in fact, black.   
                                                                                                                      
 20. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2003). 
 21. Id. at 797 (emphasis added). 
 22. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 272 (2003). 
 23. Id. at 246.  
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Under the Grutter plan, however, the courts and admissions officers 
wouldn’t have to wade into this mess: rather, they could evaluate the charla-
tan brothers in light of their overall applications, accepting or rejecting them 
without ever declaring their claim to minority status spurious. If the admis-
sions committee smelled something fishy, it could simply reject the 
application without any record of a racial determination. The split double-
header, then, allows schools to have the benefits of diversity without engag-
ing in the unpleasant process of adjudicating race. But it has done so by 
eliminating race as a factor divorced from its social context—race as a phys-
ical set of traits, at least—from the admissions process.   
If we change the hypothetical slightly, we can see the divergence be-
tween some of the Justices’ positions in Gratz and Grutter and reveal their 
common concern with the definitional problem. Justice Rehnquist was sus-
picious of the law school’s motives: he believed that the holistic review was 
little more than a racial quota masquerading as diversity plan.24 The majori-
ties, on the other hand, believed the law school’s contentions.25 Either way, 
as the following hypothetical shows, Grutter avoided racial determinations 
while Gratz encouraged them. 
Imagine we have two white applicants who, by academic standards 
alone, would be at least marginally qualified for admission to the law 
school. Were they to fib about their race on their applications, under the 
Grutter plan they could be admitted for one of several reasons. In Justice 
Rehnquist’s view, the applicants would be admitted because the school was 
engaging in thinly-veiled racial balancing—seeing an opportunity to in-
crease minority enrollment without sacrificing other numerical standards, 
the law school would, in his view, pounce on the opportunity. But under the 
Grutter majority’s view, the applicants might be admitted and might not be, 
but only because of their contribution to a diverse student body in ways re-
flected by their application as a whole—if their story didn’t seem to add up 
to a significant contribution to diversity, an admissions officer would likely 
reject them. 
Under either view of the school’s motives, the Gratz plan would reject 
the applicants, assuming the “factual review” reveals their chicane. The 
Gratz dissenters, of course, would be fine with this result: in their view, if a 
school is going to treat applicants differently by virtue of their race, then it 
ought to do so openly and systematically. But as the two contrasting hypo-
theticals show, regardless of one’s view of the motives of the law school, 
and regardless of the status of the applicants involved, Grutter avoids the 
pesky definitional problem that a school would face under a Gratz-like plan.  
III. Maybe GRUTTER Isn’t So Crazy After All 
The program at issue in Fisher uses race as an admissions factor in a 
vanishingly minimal manner. After dividing applicants into in- and out-of-
                                                                                                                      
 24. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 379  (2003) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 25. Id. at 306. 
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state groups, the University of Texas assigns each applicant an Academic 
Index Score (“AIS”) and a Personal Achievement Score (“PAS”). The latter 
is designed to “recognize qualified students whose merit as applicants was 
not adequately reflected by their [AIS].” As such, it takes into account “spe-
cial circumstances that may reflect—beginning in 2004—the applicant’s 
race.”26 But, the Fifth Circuit writes, quoting the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the university, that “race is considered as part of the 
applicant’s context whether or not the applicant belongs to a minority group, 
and so—at least in theory—it ‘can positively impact applicants of all races, 
including Caucasian[s], or [it] may have no impact whatsoever.’ ”27 Indeed,  
UT does not monitor the aggregate racial composition of the admitted ap-
plicant pool during the process [so] the admissions decision for any 
particular applicant is not affected by the number of other students of her 
racial group who have been admitted during that year . . . [and] UT’s ad-
missions procedures do not treat certain racial groups or minorities 
differently when reviewing individual applications.28  
Under this plan, it seems very unlikely that race as a factor in and of itself 
does much at all. And, in reality, it probably hasn’t done much, at least when 
compared to other affirmative action plans. Certainly, the Fifth Circuit 
would have us think so.29 
The Grutter rule examined in this light may seem hardly different from 
a rule forbidding consideration of race and allowing consideration of other 
social factors. But it is different. As the experience at the University of 
Michigan Law School pre- and post-Proposition Two suggests, the Grutter 
rule was doing something: since its demise, black, Hispanic and Native 
American enrollment fell 34.1 percent in one year.30 The Grutter rule allows 
schools to say that they’re using race so that those schools can continue to 
use other relevant social factors of their choosing, factors which often corre-
late closely with race, without fear of running afoul of constitutional law 
and while continuing to select students with other desirable qualifications. 
Imagine that Michigan Law wanted to institute a program to increase 
enrollment from Detroit, which is overwhelmingly nonwhite.31 Under any 
conceivable holding in Gratz and Grutter, it could permissibly do so. But 
were it to do so today, Michigan Law would expose itself to criticism that it 
is violating Proposition Two—and probably a lawsuit to that effect. As such, 
                                                                                                                      
 26. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 228 (2011).  
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 229 (emphasis added).  
 29. Id. at 235 (“The percentage of Hispanics at UT is less than two-thirds the percent-
age of Hispanics in Texas and the percentage of African-Americans at UT is half the 
percentage of Texas’s African-American population.”). 
 30. Elizabeth Redden, Now and Then: Minorities and Michigan, Inside Higher Ed 
(June 19, 2007, 4:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/06/19/michigan. 
 31. Detroit (city) QuickFacts, U.S. Census Bureau (Jan. 31, 2012, 5:15 PM), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/2622000.html (listing Detroit as 7.8 percent white, 
non-Hispanic). 
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the school would be deterred, at the margin at least, from adopting this kind 
of policy. Similarly, were Michigan Law to use race-conscious but facially 
race-neutral polices (like those Justice Kennedy advocated in Parents In-
volved), it would no longer be able to select its students in as nuanced a 
manner as it could under Grutter. Forcing it to be ham-handed in this re-
spect would leave the law school without the tools it needs to select 
minority students with other desirable characteristics: mainly, LSAT scores. 
So Proposition Two, which precisely mimics what a contrary holding in 
Grutter would have done, may significantly deter the Law School from pur-
suing those polices that Justice Kennedy advocated, such as programs pro-
promoting racial diversity through ostensibly geographical preferences. 
The Grutter rule, then, is prophylactic. Universities “ ‘occupy a special 
niche in our constitutional tradition,’ with educational autonomy grounded 
in the First Amendment,” the Fifth Circuit wrote in Fisher.32 “Academic 
freedom . . . includes a university’s selection of its student body.”33 That 
freedom certainly contemplates a university’s right to select students of di-
verse geographic, economic and linguistic backgrounds. Only when it runs 
up against the external constitutional norm forbidding disparate treatment on 
the basis of race does the university’s right get tricky. But if the Supreme 
Court were to forbid a university from considering race, it risks a potentially 
enormous chilling effect on the university’s ability to consider other relevant 
factors, an ability to which the university has a constitutional right.34 
In light of the familiar framework of prophylaxis from First and Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the Grutter Court might have stumbled upon an 
eminently sensible rule, one that avoids the troubling definitional problems 
illustrated by the Malones’ case and achieves a diverse student body in a 
way that protects a university’s right to choose its students by nonracially 
conscious means. Though each of these nonracially conscious means is, of 
course, constitutional, the Grutter Court has added a layer of prophylactic 
protection such that other forces do not push schools to eschew those means. 
This alternative reading of Grutter suggests that the Court ought not to 
strike down the University of Texas’s plan, regardless of its view of the con-
stitutionality of race qua race as a factor in admissions. The plan uses race in 
the minimally troubling manner of the Grutter plan and certainly, as the 
Fifth Circuit noted, does not appear to be a quota by another name. And it 
avoids stigmatizing students by forcing them to “live under a state-mandated 
racial label.”35 One must then wonder why the Court has granted certiorari 
in Fisher. Perhaps the Court is planning to reconsider the notion of critical 
mass it detailed in Gutter and rule that the University of Texas has reached 
one, suggesting a more active role for the Court in policing the outer bound-
aries of affirmative action plans. Regardless, it seems very likely that the 
                                                                                                                      
 32. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 231 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)) . 
 33. Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 
(2003). 
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Court is planning to overturn Grutter or at least substantially retreat from it. 
Before scrapping it though, the Court should consider the full effects of its 
decision in Grutter. 
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